

## Second Muṇḍaka Section 1

However, this conclusion happens to be wrong. One has to know the fallacy in this conclusion. The logic given above is valid if the object of knowledge is remote. Brahman is not something that is remote because, even before you know, it is *aparokṣa*, 'I' self-evident. After knowing, it is not going to become *parokṣa*, remote. There is no question of one gaining an indirect knowledge of Brahman by the words of the *śāstra*. This is pointed out here with an example.

*Yathā sudīptāt pāvakaṭ visphuliṅgāḥ prabhavante* : just as shining sparks come out of well-lighted fire. *Visphuliṅgāḥ* means sparks. In thousands they emerge from fire. *Pāvaka* is a name for fire because it purifies. The sparks that emerge from fire have the same nature as that of fire. Each spark reveals itself without another light. Heat and light, the two intrinsic attributes of the fire, are there in the spark. When a spark comes and strikes, one feels the heat. Even though the sparks seem to be separate from the fire, they are not; they are *sarūpāḥ*, of the same nature as that of the fire alone.

It is because of the *nāma-rūpa-upādhi*, one calls them sparks, like even water is called a drop or tears or a river or ocean, due to different *upādhis*. Fire is always fire, whether it is in the form of a flame or a conflagration or a spark; it does not give up its nature any time.

*Tathākṣarād vīvidhāḥ bhāvāḥ prajāyante tatra caiva apiyanti*: likewise, varieties of things and beings are born in millions from the *akṣaram brahma* and they go back unto that Brahman alone. The word '*bhāvāḥ*' refers to various existent things like the five elements, the five sense objects, the individual body-mind-sense complex, being like *devas* along with their heavenly names such as

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१ यद्यत् शात्र-गम्यम् तत्तत् परोक्षं । शास्त्र-वेद्यत्वात् स्वर्ग-पुन्य-पापादिवत् ।

Indra, Varuṇa Agni, and human beings with their individual names. Here, let us take the *bhāvas* as only conscious beings.

The spark example is excellent if one understands it properly. Otherwise, it can create all kinds of problems. Here, the example is not meant to show that the sparks come from the fire and go back into the fire, but it is to point out that one fire alone is in the form of many sparks due to many *upādhis*. The spark has some kind of *upādhi-viśeṣa*, attributes of a limited form. It is fire with a dimension of its own. With this conditioning, the fire is called a spark. Therefore, we use two different words, 'spark' and 'fire'. The sparks are many, but all of them are one fire. That is the extent of the example here. Similarly, from the *akṣaram brahma*, different *jīvas* are born because of the *upādhis*,<sup>7</sup> body-mind-sense complexes. There are different types of *upādhis* like *manuṣya-upādhi*, *deva-upādhi*, *gandharva-upādhi*, *yakṣa-upādhi*, and so on. The animals and trees also have their *upādhis*. All of them are from *akṣaram brahma*.

The *akṣaram brahma* is *caitanya*, consciousness. From that *caitanya* so many *jīvas* are born. Each one of them is *ātman*, a conscious being. Therefore, how many conscious beings have come out now? They are so many. Each one has got a name, a peculiar form and individuality with its own problems. Even though many and varied *jīvas* have come, they are one *caitanya* only.

The difference in knowledge between *jīva* and *Īśvara* is due to the *upādhi* called *buddhi*. The *jīva*'s *buddhi* has limited knowledge, and therefore it is like a spark. The *akṣaram brahma* is not subject to fragmentation. A fragmentation takes place in time and place, in the sense, the object that obtained before is not the same now; it has become many parts. This kind of division is possible only when there is a spatial gap between the divided parts. There is no gap between the space obtaining 'here' and the one obtaining 'elsewhere'. There is space in between also, and so space is indivisible.

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\* नाना-देहोपाधि-भेदमनुविधीयमानत्वाद् विविधाः। च मुण्डक भाष्यम् फ